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NOTE
ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREATMENT
IN OHIO: IS JASON'S LAW
LIFE-SAVING LEGISLATION OR
A RASH RESPONSE?
Steven Strangt
I. INTRODUCTION
On Friday, May 25, 2007, Cleveland Heights police officer Jason
West responded to a call about a street fight.' Arriving at the scene,
West spotted a car pulling into an adjacent driveway.2 West pulled
his cruiser in front of the car to block it from escaping.3 West stepped
out of his cruiser and the driver of the car opened fire on West, then
exited the car and shot West at close range.4 West died from the
wounds.5
The Cleveland Heights police arrested twenty-seven year old
Timothy Halton Jr. for the shooting that evening. 6 Halton is a schizo-
phrenic with a long history of violent behavior.7 Convicted in 2005
for assaulting a South Euclid police officer, Halton was sentenced to
four years of probation. 8 During his probationary period, Halton re-
mained on schedule with his medical visits and received the shots that
kept his often-violent psychosis under control. In fact, Halton's pa-
l J.D. Candidate 2009, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. I
would like to thank my mom, Jan Clifford, dad, Carter Strang, and grandparents, Lois
and Fred Heinlen.
1 Rachel Dissell, Donna Miller & Scott Stephens, How the Shooting
Occurred, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), May 27, 2007, at A14.
2 See id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Phillip Morris, 'We Tried to Get Help,' Halton's Mother Says, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), May 31, 2007, at A 1.
6 Dissell et al., supra note 1.
7 See Halton Crime History, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), May 30,
2007, at A6. Halton had recently beaten a man outside of his residence.8 Morris, supra note 5.
role ended early because of his improving behavior. That is when his
mother, Jeanette Tiggs, began to notice that her son started to with-
draw and again display a violent temperament, signs he was not taking
his medication.9 Because Halton was no longer in the legal system,
Tiggs did not know what to do. On Saturday May 26, 2007, she
received the call she had been dreading: her son had finally snapped
and killed someone. 10
Society poorly understands and roundly fears mental illness. This
fear is cultivated by publicized acts of violence by mentally ill indi-
viduals, l' recently the shooting at Virginia Tech by an individual a
state court had declared "mentally ill and in need of hospitalization.'
2
These instances stir fear in the public, and have prompted lawmakers
to adopt programs that facilitate the outpatient commitment of the
mentally ill.13 Assisted outpatient treatment ("AOT") involves invol-
untary court-ordered treatment for the mentally ill that allows them to
remain in the community, rather than be hospitalized. 14 Absent these
programs, people with mental illness would be hospitalized against
their will upon a court determination that they were a danger to them-
selves or others; if a court does not find this, a mentally ill individual
has the same personal freedom as anyone else. AOT is an inter-
mediate step between hospitalization and total autonomy that man-
dates some level of supervision, 5 and includes steps such as therapy,
participation in treatment programs, supervised living arrangements,
or the acceptance of psychiatric medication. 16 If the patient fails to
9 See id.
10 Id.
11 See generally Don't Let Dangerous Maniacs Roam Free, N.Y. POST, May
3, 1999, at 34; Joy Alter Hubel, Patching the Safety Net for the Mentally Ill, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 24, 1999, at LI 1; Jackie Halifax, Deputy's Killing Behind Passage of New
State Law, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 31, 2004, at B6; CNN.com, Killer's Manifesto: 'You
Forced Me into a Corner,' http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/04/18/vtech.shooting/
index.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2008) (describing the Virginia Tech massacre);
Harlan Spector, Halton Brings Attention to Mandatory Treatment, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland, Ohio), July 14, 2007, at Al.
12 Killer's Manifesto: 'You Forced Me into a Corner, 'supra note 11.
13 Jennifer Gutterman, Note, Waging a War on Drugs: Administering a Le-
thal Dose to Kendra 's Law, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2401, 2402 (2000).
14 Jeffry Draine, Conceptualizing Services Research on Outpatient Commit-
ment, 24 J. OF BEHAV. HEALTH SERVICES & RES. 306, 306 (1997).
15 See Gutterman, supra note 13, at 2403.
16 Jennifer Honig & Susan Stefan, New Research Continues to Challenge the
Need for Outpatient Commitment, 31 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
109, 110 (2005).
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satisfy the requirements of an AOT program, he is subject to legal
consequences that often result in institutionalization.
7
On August 21, 2007, State Representative Mark Patton introduced
Ohio House Bill 299,18 which aims to implement a new mandatory
AOT program in Ohio. As of March 18, 2008, the bill is in the
House's Health Committee.' 9 Patton proposed the bill in response to
the killing of Jason West, and he has named the measure "Jason's
Law." The bill is intended to protect both the potential victims of
violent mentally ill individuals who fail to take prescribed medication,
and the mentally ill themselves.20 Under current Ohio law, courts can
only order mentally ill people who present an imminent threat to
themselves or others into hospitals or treatment.2' Only hospitals may
administer psychotropic medication to the mentally ill, and to force
medication the hospital needs a second court order.22 Under Jason's
Law, probate judges could order mentally ill people into outpatient
treatment and order them hospitalized if they don't take their medica-
tions or participate in treatment. The legal standard for subjecting a
patient to these treatment programs is more relaxed than in Ohio's
current mental health law.24 Jason's Law is modeled after a law in
New York called Kendra's Law, which was passed after a man suffer-
ing from schizophrenic delusions pushed a woman into an oncoming a
subway train.25 In response to similar tragedies, many other states,
such as California, North Carolina, Florida, and Alabama, have
adopted similar legislation.26
This Note analyzes Jason's Law, highlighting its potential short-
comings. Ultimately it offers suggested revisions by comparing the
language of the bill to legislation other states have adopted and im-
17 id.
"8 H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007).
19 Id. This is the third step in how a bill becomes a law in Ohio. Next, a bill
needs to pass the Rules Committee, pass an open vote in the House by a majority of
the membership, and obtain the Governor's signature. See How a Bill Becomes a
Law in Ohio, http://www.olrs.oh.gov/ASP/olrsBillBecomesLaw.asp (last visited
Sept. 5, 2008).
20 Mark Rollenhagen, Statehouse Bill Could Force Drugs on Mentally Ill,
PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Aug. 23, 2007, at B 1.
21 id.
22 id.
23 id.
24 See id.
25 Id.
26 For an exhaustive list of states, see TREATMENT ADVOCACY CTR., STATE
STANDARDS FOR ASSISTED TREATMENT (2007), http://www.treatmentadvocacy
center.org/LegalResources/documents/StateStandards-TheText_000.pdf [hereinafter
STATE STANDARDS].
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plemented. Part II describes the background of AOT programs and
what they entail. Part III examines Ohio's current AOT program and
analyzes the text of Jason's Law. Part IV compares the most impor-
tant provisions of Jason's Law with other states' AOT laws. This
section specifically compares the Ohio bill to New York's Kendra's
Law because of the substantial similarities between the two. Part V
examines how state and federal courts have interpreted Kendra's Law,
and consequently how Ohio courts may treat Jason's Law. This Note
concludes by suggesting several changes that should be made to Ja-
son's Law that would both safeguard the rights of patients, and pro-
vide the legal mechanism society needs to protect itself from the dan-
gers unmedicated psychiatric patients may pose.
II. BACKGROUND OF AOT PROGRAMS
AOT programs developed as a result of the deinstitutionalization
movement that began in the mid-1950's. 27 Deinstitutionalization is
the shifting of treatment for the mentally ill away from commitment in
hospitals to a community-based setting.28 There are several reasons
why the movement picked up steam during this period. In 1955 Smith
Kline & French Laboratories introduced Thorazine, the first antipsy-
chotic medication. 29 Prior to the drug's availability, mental illnesses
such as schizophrenia30 required long-term confinement because there
was no way to effectively treat the disease. Medication revolutionized
the way patients could be treated by relieving the symptoms of psy-
chosis, such as delusions, hallucinations, paranoia, and agitation.3'
32This eventually led to fewer violent episodes. Medication made it
27 See EF Torrey & RJ Kaplan, A National Survey of the Use of Outpatient
Commitment, 46 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 778, 778 (1995).28 See Gutterman, supra note 13, at 2406-07.
29 Ilissa L. Watnik, Comment, A Constitutional Analysis of Kendra's Law:
New York's Solution for the Treatment of the Chronically Mentally Ill, 149 U. PA. L.
REv. 1181, 1184 (2001).
30 "Schizophrenia is a serious brain disorder that distorts the way a person
thinks, acts, expresses emotions, perceives reality and relates to others. People with
schizophrenia - the most chronic and disabling of the major mental illnesses - often
have problems functioning in society, at work and at school, and in relationships.
Schizophrenia can leave its sufferer frightened and withdrawn." WebMD.com,
Schizophrenia Guide, http://www.webmd.con/schizophrenia/guide/mental-health-
schizophrenia (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
31 See BRUCE A. ARRIGO, THE CONTOURS OF PSYCHIATRIC JUSTICE: A
POSTMODERN CRITIQUE OF MENTAL ILLNESS, CRIMINAL INSANITY, AND THE LAW 80
(1996).
32 id.
250 [Vol. 19:247
ASSISTED OUTPATIENT TREA TMENTIN OHIO
possible for patients to function in the community, and enabled states
to integrate patients into society.
States also had a monetary incentive to discharge patients. When
the federal government introduced Medicaid in 1965, Congress
excluded Medicaid payments for patients in state psychiatric hospi-
tals.3 3 The purpose of excluding payments was to encourage deinsti-
tutionalization, thereby shifting the costs of caring for patients to the
individual states.34 States subsequently moved large numbers of
patients out of hospital settings and into communities so Medicaid
reimbursement would be available.
35
Another reason deinstitutionalization became widespread was that
state mental hospitals were overcrowded, under-funded, and anti-
quated.36 Thus, patients did not actually receive adequate care in
these institutions. The treatment of individuals in communities was
also recognized as superior from a clinical standpoint, as institutional
living tends to foster passive and dependant behavior. Individuals in a
community setting can develop and maintain basic social capacities
and independent behavior that institutionalized patients simply can-
not,37 which helps them eventually integrate into society.
Finally, concern for the civil rights of patients motivated the
deinstitutionalization movement. 38 People became increasingly con-
cerned that institutionalization violated mental patients' rights to re-
fuse commitment and treatment under the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 39 Because of deinstitutionaliza-
tion, state hospitals have cut more than ninety-percent of their services
since 1960, and roughly forty-four state hospitals closed in the 1990's
alone.4°
Outpatient treatment is an outgrowth of the community based-
treatment approach. AOT programs add a legal structure to these
community programs by requiring mentally ill individuals to partici-
33 Watnik, supra note 29, at 1184.
34 Id. at 1185.
35 Treatment Advocacy Ctr., Homelessness, Incarceration, Episodes of Vio-
lence: Way of Life for Almost Half of Americans with Untreated Severe Mental Ill-
ness, http://www.Psychlaws.org/GeneralResources/fact2.htm (last visited Sept. 5,
2008) [hereinafter Homelessness, Incarceration, Episodes of Violence].
36 Gutterman, supra note 13, at 2407.
37 See id.
38 id.
39 These amendments forbid the federal government from depriving any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of the law. U.S. CONST.
amends. V, XIV, § 1. For a detailed discussion of these rights, see infra Part V.A.
40 Homelessness, Incarceration, Episodes of Violence, supra note 35.
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pate in them.a' Currently, forty-two states permit the use of AOT,42
including Ohio.4 3 Like Ohio, most of these states have the same crite-
ria for admitting patients into AOT and institutionalizing them.
44
However, the specific treatments available, the people covered by
these laws, and the ramifications of violating a court-ordered treat-
ment program differ.4a Some states use outpatient care to treat people
who do not qualify for inpatient care. 6 Others use outpatient care as
an alternative to forced institutionalization, reserving institutionaliza-
tion for severely ill individuals who pose an immediate danger.47
Of the forty-two states that employ AOT, only thirteen have legal
criteria that differ for inpatient and outpatient treatment.4a In these
states, the standards for inpatient commitment are more stringent than
that for outpatient commitment, most likely due to the increased
restraint on personal liberty.49 The creation of a different standard
allows the states to reach people with their AOT programs who would
not be subject to commitment under inpatient statutes.5 °
III. AOT TREATMENT IN OHIO AND JASON'S LAW
A. Ohio's Current Statute
Ohio's current AOT law has the same standards for inpatient and
outpatient care, which are as follows:
41 Elizabeth Dickinson Furlong, Note, Coercion in the Community: The
Application of Rogers Guardianship to Outpatient Commitment, 21 NEw ENG. J. ON
CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 485, 486 (1995).
42 Treatment Advocacy Ctr., Treatment Advocacy Center Briefing Paper:
Assisted Outpatient Treatment, http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/
BriefingPapers/BP4.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Briefing Paper].
43 See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 5122.01(B), 5122.15(C) (West 2001 &
Supp. 2007).
44 See Treatment Advocacy Center, http://www.treatmentadvocacy
center.org/BriefingPapers/BP4.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2007).
45 See STATE STANDARDS, supra note 26.
46 See ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.2 (LexisNexis 2006) (describing when a men-
tally ill person may be committed to outpatient treatment).
47 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.1-21 (2002).
48 See STATE STANDARDS, supra note 26, at 2-3, 9-13,19-20, 23-24, 26-29,
35-41 (describing the differences in outpatient and inpatient commitment in Alabama,
Alaska, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, North
Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and Washington).
49 Watnik, supra note 29, at 1191.
'o Id. at 1191-92 & n.53 (citing WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.240 (West
Supp. 2001)).
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If, upon completion of the hearing, the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence that the respondent is a mentally ill
person subject to hospitalization by court order, the court shall
order the respondent for a period not to exceed ninety days to
any of the following [placement options, which include state
or private psychiatric facilities and assisted outpatient treat-
ment]. 51
A mentally ill patient becomes "subject to hospitalization by court
order" when the patient, because of the mental illness:
(1) Represents a substantial risk of physical harm to self as
manifested by evidence of threats of, or attempts at, suicide or
serious self-inflicted bodily harm;
(2) Represents a substantial risk of physical harm to others as
manifested by evidence of recent homicidal or other violent
behavior, evidence of recent threats that place another in rea-
sonable fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm, or
other evidence of present dangerousness;
(3) Represents a substantial and immediate risk of serious
physical impairment or injury to self as manifested by evi-
dence that the person is unable to provide for and is not pro-
viding for the person's basic physical needs because of the
person's mental illness and that appropriate provision for
those needs cannot be made immediately available in the
community; or
(4) Would benefit from treatment in a hospital for his mental
illness and is in need of such treatment as manifested by evi-
dence of behavior that creates a grave and imminent risk to
substantial rights of others or himself.
5 2
If the court finds any of these prongs, it can direct a patient to
either an institution or AOT program.53 It is completely within the
discretion of the judge to decide which option is appropriate. 54
B. Jason's Law
The purpose of Jason's Law is to differentiate the legal standard
for inpatient hospitalization and AOT. The bill requires that findings
51 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(C) (West 2001).
52 § 5122.01(B).
" §§ 5122.01(B), .15(C).
14 See § 5122.15(C).
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be made by "clear and convincing evidence,"55 and provides as
follows:
(2) The respondent must meet all of the following criteria be-
fore the court may order that the respondent participate in
assisted outpatient treatment:
(a) The respondent is at least eighteen years old.
(b) The respondent is suffering from mental illness.
(c) The respondent is unlikely to survive safely in the com-
munity without supervision based on determination by a men-
tal health professional.
(d) The respondent has a history of lack of compliance with
treatment for mental illness and either of the following has
occurred:
(i) At least twice in thirty-six months prior to filing the peti-
tion, the respondent's mental illness has been a significant
factor in hospitalization, services, or other related treatment,
not including any current period of hospitalization, services,
or other related treatment or period of hospitalization,
services, or other related treatment ending in the six months
prior to filing the petition.
(ii) In the forty-eight months prior to filing the petition, the
respondent's mental illness has been a significant cause of
one or more acts of serious violent behavior toward the
respondent's self or others or the cause of threats of, or
attempts at, serious physical harm to the respondent's self or
other, not including any current period of hospitalization, ser-
vices, or other related treatment or period of hospitalization,
services, or other related treatment ending in the six months
prior to filing the petition.56
The bill lowers the legal threshold for implementing outpatient
care from the substantial risk of harm as manifested by evidence 57
currently required to a lower standard of potential dangerousness.
C. Analysis of Jason's Law
The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that the State can medicate
individuals once they are involuntarily hospitalized. 58 Jason's Law
" H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., § 340.22(C)(1)(Ohio 2007).
56 H.B. 299 § 340.21(B)(2).
17 See § 5122.01(B).
58 Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Bd., 736 N.E.2d 10, 18
(Ohio 2000) (holding that a physician may force antipsychotic medication upon an
[Vol. 19:247
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takes this a step further by allowing the medication of those not
already admitted into a hospital. The legal requirement for adminis-
tering medication under Jason's Law is lower than what is currently
required to hospitalize a patient,59 which could present a Due Process
problem under the Ohio and Federal Constitutions, both of which
afford patients a right to refuse medication. 60 It is therefore possible
courts will find the bill unconstitutional.61
Jason's Law specifically outlines the procedure required to initiate
an AOT proceeding. The bill allows ordinary citizens to "file a peti-
tion for an order requiring a person to participate in an assisted outpa-
tient treatment program. 62 This petition must contain an assertion by
the petitioner that the respondent meets certain enumerated criteria,
63
as well as an affidavit by a mental health professional. 64
The list of potential petitioners is long: any person who is at least
eighteen and lives with the patient, any parent, sibling, spouse, or
child of the patient who is at least eighteen, "a mental health profes-
sional who ... is providing mental health services" to the patient, or a
parole or probation officer supervising the patient.65 The list includes
people who may be in the best position to be able to observe the
patient, but is expansive enough to allow individuals who have no
medical expertise or little contact with the patient to compel a court to
hold an AOT hearing.66 Because it could prove costly for patients to
defend themselves at a hearing, there is a possibility a petitioner could
use this power improperly. For example, an estranged parent or
sibling who does not have much contact with a patient could use the
threat of a hearing as leverage, or a relative could overreact to harm-
less behavior and cause the patient considerable inconvenience.
Along with the original petition, Jason's Law requires an affidavit
by a single mental health professional that has either examined or
attempted to examine the patient, certifying that the patient is
"unlikely to survive safely in the community.,,67 This gives an indi-
involuntarily committed patient when three specific criteria are met).
59 From the substantial risk of harm as manifested by evidence currently
required to a lesser standard of potential dangerousness.
60 See In re Guardianship of Willis, 599 N.E.2d 745 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
61 However, this is an unlikely result. For a more detailed analysis, see dis-
cussion infra Part V.
6 H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., § 340.2 1(A) (Ohio 2007).
63 H.B. 299 § 340.21(B)(1). For these criteria, see discussion supra Part
IlI.B
64 H.B. 299 § 340.2 1(B)(1)(c).
65 H.B. 299 § 340.21(A).
66 See H.B. 299 § 340.2 1(A).
67 H.B. 299 §§ 340.21(B)(1)(c), (2)(c).
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vidual professional significant discretion and power. The "unlikely to
survive safely in the community" test predicts future behavior, and
there is no requirement that the professional cite the past behavior that
led him to this conclusion. This type of general diagnosis is inher-
ently less specific, more subjective, and potentially less accurate than
diagnoses based on specified past behavior.68 For this reason, many
,,69similar statutes use clearer standards than "unlikely.
The mental health professional that submits the affidavit may be a
member of an expansive list of professions, including a certified
nurse-midwife, a physician authorized to practice osteopathic medi-
cine, and independent marriage and family therapists.70 This leaves
the ability to file an affidavit within the province of thousands of indi-
viduals, many of whom do not specialize in diagnoses of psychosis.
Furthermore, the professional needs to have made an attempt to speak
with the patient, not to actually have done so. If the professional is
unsuccessful in this attempt, he can still file an affidavit if he "has
reason to suspect that the respondent meets the [required] criteria. ' 71
What this "reason to believe" entails is not defined. This exception
could make it very easy to subject a patient to an AOT proceeding.
Jason's Law also specifies procedural steps to be taken after the
petition is filed. The hearing after the filing of the initial petition is
scheduled within three business days following review of the petition.
The subject has a right to counsel at the hearing, and may present evi-
dence and direct and cross-examine any witnesses. 72 This right to
counsel and to confront witnesses is an important constitutional safe-
guard in the bill, because it addresses the respondent's Sixth
Amendment rights to be "confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and
to have the [a]ssistance of [c]ounsel for his defense. 73
To prevail at the hearing and institute an AOT plan, the State must
show that the patient has a "history of lack of compliance" 74 with
68 This is especially troubling because these diagnoses of past behavior have
already been found unreliable by the Supreme Court. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 430 (1979).
69 These statutes require professionals to specify the past episodes that led to
the conclusion. See STATE STANDARDS, supra note 26, at 11-12, 39-40, 43-44 (citing
HAw. REv. STAT. § 334-121 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 37.1-67.3(I) (1976) (current
version at VA. CODE ANN. § 37.2-814 to -818 (2007)); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 25-10-
110(a) (2007).
70 H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., § 340.20(A)(4) (Ohio 2007).
71 H.B. 299 § 340.21(B)(1)(c)(ii).
72 H.B. 299 §§ 340.22(A), (E)(1).
73 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
74 H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., § 340.2 1(B)(2)(d) (Ohio 2007).
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treatment for mental illness. What exactly this history must consist of
is never defined or explained. As a result, Jason's Law does not
require any prior formal finding of lack of compliance, such as evi-
dence from medical records, police reports, or even a complaint
lodged with the patient's mental health professional. Presumably, a
lay-witness could testify that the patient was noncompliant, and would
need no evidence to back up the claim.
Once the lack of compliance prong is satisfied, the State needs to
prove either that the patient has attempted to harm himself or another
once in the last forty-eight months, or that the patient's mental illness
was a significant factor in hospitalization, services, or other related
treatment twice in the last thirty-six months.75 The "other related
treatment" clause appears to include any treatment related to mental
illness, including an appointment with a psychologist, or possibly
even a meeting with a social worker. If the State was unable to prove
either of these elements, or the respondent was able to rebut the show-
ing, the respondent would not be subject to AOT.76
The State also must show that the respondent is "unlikely to
survive safely in the community without supervision based on deter-
mination by a mental health professional. 77 This is the same standard
required for the affidavit in the original petition for the hearing, and
the language is not clarified.
In addition, a mental health professional needs to sign an affida-
vit, certifying that he has examined the respondent and the respondent
meets the above criteria.78 If the patient is not able to secure an expert
of his own, only this one physician needs to examine the patient to
subject him to AOT.79 This fact is troubling in light of the U.S.
Supreme Court's finding that because they are drawn from impres-
sions that result from subjective analysis, psychiatric diagnoses are
inherently inaccurate.
80
Jason's Law also specifies how the AOT plan itself must be
drafted and implemented. "[T]he executive director of the board of
alcohol, drug addiction, and mental health service[s].. . of the county
in which the petition is filed" is responsible for drafting the plan.81
" H.B. 299 § 340.21(B)(2)(d) (emphasis added).
76 H.B. 299 § 340.22(C)(2).
7' H.B. 299 § 340.21(B)(2)(c).
'8 H.B. 299 § 340.2 1(B)(1)(c).
" See H.B. 299 § 340.2 1(C).
80 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979) (finding that psychiat-
ric diagnoses are too unreliable to meet the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard).
See discussion infra Part V.A.
"' H.B. 299 § 340.22(B).
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This plan must be the least restrictive means necessary for providing
treatment.82 This language could prove significant, because a respon-
dent could contest the AOT plan on the grounds that there are less
restrictive means of accomplishing the same ends.
Respondents also have the opportunity to participate in the devel-
opment of the plan. 83 This can make the plan less restrictive and a
better fit for the patient's lifestyle. Critics of the law will argue that
the patient's opportunity to participate is a mere formality, as the
patient does not have any actual power to influence the plan. This is
partly because Jason's Law does not specify exactly when this partici-
pation is to occur. Between the initial review of the petition and the
hearing there is only a three day window in which the patient has the
opportunity to participate in drafting the plan. Participation would
either have to occur during this brief period, or by modification after
the plan's implementation.
Once the plan is implemented, the mental health professional
providing treatment to the subject must make any changes by petition-
ing the issuing court.84 If the treatment provider wishes to make any
substantive changes, however, the patient must agree to them or there
is a formal hearing.85 This hearing is important in that it gives the
patient a way to contest anything a supervising psychiatrist may want
to change that a patient dislikes. Noticeably absent from Jason's Law
is a mechanism by which the patient may initiate any changes to the
plan on his own.
If the patient fails to comply with the court ordered plan, Jason's
Law authorizes the initiation of inpatient hospitalization proceed-
ings. 86 The bill does not modify Ohio's existing inpatient commit-
ment procedures.87
IV. SIMILAR LEGISLATION IN OTHER STATES
Representative Patton introduced Jason's Law in response to a
tragedy involving a mentally ill individual. Many other states imple-
mented their AOT programs in response to similar tragedies. Florida
enacted an AOT program in 200588 in response to a deadly encounter
between a schizophrenic man and Tampa police.89 New York enacted
82 id.
83 id.
84 H.B. 299 § 340.23.
85 id.
86 H.B. 299 § 340.24.
87 See H.B. 299 § 340.24.
88 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.4655(1) (West 2006).
89 See Alexander Sasha Bardey, Treatments Before Tragedy: Lessons from
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Kendra's Law 90 after a schizophrenic man pushed a woman in front of
an oncoming subway train.9' Michigan passed Kevin's Law92 in re-
sponse to an incident in which a schizophrenic individual beat a col-
lege man to death.93 California passed Laura's Law94 after a mental
health patient off of his mediation shot a woman to death.95 The list
of similar statutes does not end there, and Jason's Law has a great deal
in common with many of these statutes. Therefore, a survey of a few
states' AOT statutes helps cast light on both how effective Jason's
Law will be, and what challenges it may face. The statutes that follow
are particularly relevant because of either their substantial similarity
to Jason's Law, or their contrasting approaches to AOT.
A. Arizona
Arizona's AOT law96 is representative of twenty-nine state laws
that have the same inpatient and outpatient criteria,97 a number that
includes Ohio. Its terms are fairly typical of these states' statutes:
patients have no say in the formulation of their plans, the medical
director may make changes to an already implemented plan without
notifying the patient,98 and the patient can be returned to inpatient care
at any time without a hearing. 99 While these terms are similar to those
in Jason's Law, the bill is more restrictive to patient rights in one sig-
nificant way: Jason's Law does not require that the patient be eligible
for the stricter inpatient commitment criteria.'00
Kendra's Law, TAMPA TRIBUNE, Mar. 15, 2003; Jackie Hallifax, Deputy's Killing
Behind Passage of New Law, MIAMI Herald, Dec. 13, 2004, at 6B.
90 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2006).
91 Fredric U. Dicker, State Law Will Make Mentally Ill Take Medicine, N.Y.
POST, Aug 4, 1999, at 2.
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1401 (West 1999)..
93 Editorial, Jason's Law: Requiring Mentally Ill People to Take Their Medi-
cations Would be a Benefit to All Ohioans, Not an Unfair Imposition, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland, Ohio), June 3, 2007, at M2.
94 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5346 (West Supp 2008).
95 Editorial, supra note 93.
96 ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-540 (2003); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-450.1
(2003).
97 See STATE STANDARDS, supra note 26 (listing the statutes and their provi-
sions). For a list of these statutes and their provisions, see Treatment Advocacy
Center, http://www.treatmentadvocacycenter.org/LegalResources/documents/
StateStandards-TheText_000.pdf (last visited Dec. 30, 2007).
91 See ARIz. REV. STAT. § 36-450.01(A)(3), (H) (2003).
99 § 36-540(E)(4).
1oo See Watnik, supra note 29, at 1191.
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B. California
California's AOT program,' 0' Laura's Law, is very similar to Ja-
son's Law. For an AOT order to be issued, the patient must:
(1) be eighteen years or older;
(2) be suffering from a mental illness; and
(3) have been subject to a clinical determination that he or she
is unlikely to survive safely in the community without super-
vision.
Additionally, the patient must have a history of lack of compli-
ance with treatment and a mental illness that has either:
(a) resulted in necessary hospitalization or treatment at least
twice within the last thirty-six months; or
(b) resulted in one or more acts of serious and violent behav-
ior toward himself or others, or threats or attempts at such
acts, within the last forty-eight months. 1
02
The patient must have a condition that is "substantially deteriorat-
ing[,]" and must have had the opportunity to participate in a voluntary
treatment plan and failed or refused to do so.'
0 3
These provisions are nearly identical to Jason's Law. Addition-
ally, Laura's Law requires that the proposed plan be the "least restric-
tive placement necessary to ensure the person's recovery and stabil-
ity.'1°4 This is almost the exact language used in Jason's Law, 10 5 and
is a significant safeguard for a patient.
There are several differences between Laura's and Jason's Laws.
Laura's Law requires that the patient have a "substantially deteriorat-
ing" condition and have had a prior opportunity to participate in a
voluntary plan, a provision not in Jason's Law. This requirement is
probably inconsequential, because, without a definition of what "dete-
riorating" means, this prong would likely be satisfied with a very
general allegation of deteriorating behavior.
101 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5346 (West Supp 2008).
102 Emily S. Huggins, Note, Assisted Outpatient Treatment: An
Unconstitutional Invasion of Protected Rights or a Necessary Government Safe-
guard?, 30 J. LEGIs. 305, 310 (2004) (citing CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5346(a)(l)-
(4)).
103 § 5346(a)(5)-(6).
104 § 5346(a)(7).
'05 H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., § 340.22(B) (Ohio 2007) ("The
services provided pursuant to the assisted outpatient treatment plan shall be the least
restrictive services necessary for treating respondent.").
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The provision in Laura's Law that a patient must have had a pre-
vious opportunity to participate in an optional program provides a
significant safeguard for a patient that is not in Jason's Law. 10 6 In a
hearing the patient can show that he was never offered the opportunity
to participate in a program, which rebuts any possible court-mandated
plan. While this provision does safeguard the rights of a potential
patient, it could handcuff a court and release a clearly dangerous indi-
vidual back into society. Because this handicaps the law's effective-
ness so severely, the requirement of a past offer to participate should
not be incorporated into Jason's Law.
Laura's Law is applicable in "any county in which services are
available."' 7 It is up to the individual counties to determine whether
they wish to adopt the programs, and then they must make a formal
request to the State if they wish to implement a program. 10 8 In this
request, the county must certify that it will not implement Laura's
Law at the expense of any other mental health programs.'0 9 There-
fore, the county must raise additional funds to implement a program.
This precludes all but the richest counties from even considering
AOT. As of 2006, less than half of California's counties had enacted
such programs, making the bill largely impotent.110 There is no simi-
lar provision in Jason's Law,1 l' nor should there be if the bill is to be
fully implemented and effective. Research reveals that there is little
jurisprudence devoted to California's AOT because it is not widely
implemented.
C. North Carolina
North Carolina is the leader in implementing preventative
commitment measures." 2 The State's AOT program is particularly
interesting because of the extensive research done on its effectiveness.
The statute itself is structured differently from Jason's Law. Any
person who has knowledge that another is mentally ill and poses a
danger to himself or others, or is in need of treatment to prevent a
:06 § 5346(a)(5).
107 § 5346(a).
108 See Eve Bender, Government News: Law Gives California Counties
Commitment Authority, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Nov. 15, 2002, available at
http://pngsychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/37/22/12.
Editorial, Carrying Out 'Laura's Law,' S.F. CHRON., Mar. 21, 2006, at B6,
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file-/chronicle/archive/2006/
03/21/EDGU9GJFMHI 1.DTL.
11 Id.
". See H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007).
112 Watnik, supra note 29, at 1193.
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deterioration that would result in dangerousness, can file a petition to
have the person taken into custody and examined by a mental health
professional."l 3 The physician or eligible psychologist shall recom-
mend outpatient commitment if he finds:
(a) The respondent is mentally ill;
(b) The respondent is capable of surviving safely in the com-
munity with available supervision from family, friends, or
others;
(c) Based on the respondent's psychiatric history, the respon-
dent is in need of treatment in order to prevent further disabil-
ity or deterioration that would predictably result in danger-
ousness as defined by G.S. 122C-3(1 1); and
(d) The respondent's current mental status or the nature of the
respondent's illness limits or negates the respondent's ability
to make an informed decision to seek voluntarily or comply
with recommended treatment."l4
If a party demonstrates all of the above conditions, a court may
order outpatient commitment for a period not exceeding 90 days."15
Like Jason's Law, North Carolina's statute uses a test that tries to
predict future behavior. 1 6 Unlike Jason's Law, North Carolina's law
allows virtually anyone to submit an affidavit that may result in an
AOT hearing. Therefore, before any medical diagnosis is made, an
individual may be taken into custody and examined.' 17  This is
significantly more restrictive to patients than Jason's Law, which
requires a mental health professional to at least attempt to examine the
patient before he can be taken into custody."
18
The effects of North Carolina's AOT program are well docu-
mented. 19 One study found that patients who underwent sustained
and intense outpatient treatment had fewer hospital admissions and
... Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(a) (2007), with H.B. 299 §
340.21 (A) (allowing only an enumerated list of people to file a petition).
114 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-263(d)(1) (2007).
"' § 122C-271(a)(1).
116 See § 122C-263(d)(1)(c).
117 See § 122C-261(b).
118 H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., § 340.21 (B)(1)(c) (Ohio 2007).
119 See Marvin S. Swartz et al., A Randomized Controlled Trial of Outpatient
Commitment in North Carolina, 52 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 325 (2001), available at
http://psychservices.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/52/3/325; Robert D. Miller
& Paul B. Fiddleman, Involuntary Civil Commitment in North Carolina: The Result of
the 1979 Statutory Changes, 60 N.C. L. REv. 985 (1982); Virginia Aldigd Hiday &
Teresa L. Scheid-Cook, The North Carolina Experience with Outpatient Commit-
ment: A Critical Appraisal, 10 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 215 (1987).
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fewer days in the hospital than those who had not. 20 In addition, "the
patients who underwent AOT were more likely to adhere to commu-
nity treatment, and were less likely to be violent or to be victimized.
Extended outpatient commitment was also associated with fewer
arrests of participants with a combined history of multiple
re-hospitalizations and previous arrests."' 2' The study noted that
while court orders may be effective, it is the quality of the treatment
itself that ultimately makes the difference.
22
Despite this success, another study found that "about half of those
ordered to outpatient commitment were not appropriate candidates for
such commitment because they had no prior history of hospitaliza-
tions, no indications of prior dangerousness, and no prior history of
medication refusal.' ' 2 3 This finding is grounds for a legal challenge
that the statute is over-inclusive and not rationally related to the
State's objectives. 124
Looking at these studies, it is apparent that Jason's Law could be
effective; however, it could also run the risk of being over-inclusive
and wasting state resources. Because both Ohio and North Carolina
allow so many people to petition the court for a hearing, 125 Ohio runs
the risk of having a similarly high number of frivolous petitions. 126
D. New York
Jason's Law is modeled after New York's Kendra's Law, 127 and
the two are similar. 128 Therefore, a clear understanding of Kendra's
and Jason's Laws will aid an understanding of the obstacles the latter
may face both judicially and in terms of practical implementation.
The New York legislature made its intentions in passing Kendra's
Law clear: "[t]he legislature finds that there are mentally ill persons
who are capable of living in the community with the help of family,
friends and mental health professionals, but who, without routine care
120 Swartz et al., supra note 119, at 327.
121 Id. at 327-28.
122 See id. at 329.
123 Watnik, supra note 29, at 1193.
124 Ronald L. Wisor, Jr., Note, Community Care, Competition and Coercion:
A Legal Perspective on Privatized Mental Health Care, 19 AM. J.L. & MED. 145, 169
(1993). For a more detailed analysis of potential legal challenges, see discussion infra
Part V.
125 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(ba) (19972007); H.B. 299, 127th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess., § 340.21(A)(4) (Ohio 2007).
126 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 122C-261(b) (1997); H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess., § 340.21(A)(4) (Ohio 2007).
127 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60 (McKinney 2006)..
128 See Rollenhagen, supra note 20.
20091
HEALTHMATRIX
and treatment, may relapse and become violent or suicidal, or require
hospitalization." 129 To remedy this problem, Kendra's law allows the
administration of medication in AOT. 130 A patient qualifies for AOT
if he meets seven criteria:
(1) [the patient] is eighteen years of age or older; and
(2) [the patient] is suffering from a mental illness; and
(3) [the patient] is unlikely to survive safely in the community
without supervision, based on a clinical determination; and
(4) [the patient] has a history of lack of compliance with
treatment for mental illness that has:
(i) prior to the filing of the petition, at least twice within the
last thirty-six months been a significant factor in necessitating
hospitalization.., or receipt of services in a... mental health
unit of a correctional facility ... ; or
(ii) prior to the filing of the petition, resulted in one or more
acts of serious violent behavior towards self or others or
threats of, or attempts at, serious physical harm to self or oth-
ers within the last forty-eight months... ; and
(5) [that patient] is, as a result of his or her mental illness,
unlikely to voluntarily participate in outpatient treatment that
would enable him or her to live safely in the community; and
(6) [the patient] ... is in need of assisted outpatient treatment
in order to prevent a relapse or deterioration which would be
likely to result in serious harm to the [patient] or others...;
and
(7) [the patient] is likely to benefit from assisted outpatient
treatment. 31
A court must find that the patient meets these criteria by "clear
and convincing evidence, 132 the same standard used in Jason's Law.
The similarities do not end there. Both require a finding that the
patient is "unlikely to survive safely in the community" and has a his-
tory of a "lack of compliance with medical treatment."' 133 Neither
requires a prior history of hospitalization.
134
129 Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Outpatient Commitment
Law: Kendra's Law as Case Study, 9 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 183, 194 (2003)
(citing 1999 NY. S.B. 5762, § 2).
130 See id at 194-95.
131 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c) (McKinney 2006).
132 See § 9.600)(1)-(3).
133 § 9.60(c)(4); H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., § 340.21(B)(2)
(Ohio 2007).
134 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(c) (McKinney 2006); H.B. 299 §
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AOT court proceedings under Kendra's Law are initiated by peti-
tion. Potential petitioners include parents, spouses, persons with
whom the subjects reside, children, siblings, treating psychiatrists, or
probation or parole officers. 35 This list is very similar to the list in
Jason's Law.
13 6
The actual court proceedings under the two are also very similar.
Kendra's Law provides the patient with the right to counsel at the
initial hearing, which is held within three days of the receipt of the
initial petition. 37 This short period before the hearing puts a patient at
a significant disadvantage in finding an attorney. At the actual
hearing, the State presents a physician who examined the patient
beforehand. The physician presents a treatment plan to the court,
which the patient can challenge or rebut, with an expert if the patient
can find or afford one.
Kendra's Law requires that the plan be developed in consultation
with the subject of the petition. 138 Critics argue that because the phy-
sician has ultimate authority concerning the type of plan presented to
the court, and the court has ultimate authority to ratify it, patient par-
ticipation amounts to nothing more than coerced compliance and
provides no substantive protection for the patient.1 39 Jason's Law
could fairly be subject to the same criticism.
Both Kendra's Law and Jason's Laws require the plan itself to be
the "least restrictive treatment" available for the patient. 40  This
provides a significant safeguard, as the patient could challenge the
plan by proposing another that could accomplish the same purpose in
a less restrictive manner.
Like Jason's Law, Kendra's Law relies on the testimony of only
one physician.141 Citing the unreliability of psychological predictions
of behavior, 142 critics argue that relying on one physician amounts to
guesswork and should never pass the clear and convincing evidence
threshold. 1
43
340.21 (B)(2).
135 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(e)(1) (McKinney 2006).
136 See H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., § 340.21(A) (Ohio 2007).
137 N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(g)-(h)(1) (McKinney 2006).
... See § 9.60(h)-(i).
39 Huggins, supra note 102, at 307.
140 § 9.600)(2); H.B. 299, § 340.22(B).
141 See N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(h) (McKinney 2006j).
142 Huggins, supra note 102, at 308.
143 For a discussion of this threshold, see infra Part V.
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V. COURT DECISIONS
While state laws and constitutions vary, all state civil commitment
actions must meet the Federal Constitutional minimum.' 44 Therefore,
this section first explores relevant Supreme Court decisions and how
they affect AOT programs. Because the Court has not ruled specifi-
cally on AOT, this section will then examine how the New York
courts have treated Kendra's Law. This will shed light on how Ohio
courts are likely to treat Jason's Law because of the similarities be-
tween Jason's and Kendra's Laws. This section takes into account
relevant differences between the New York and Ohio State Constitu-
tions, and how these differences may affect the treatment of AOT in
Ohio.
A. Federal Case Law
The government's power to involuntarily commit the mentally ill
is based on two principles: police power and parens patriae author-
ity.145 The former is the authority to detain an individual who is a
danger to himself or another in order to secure the safety of the com-
munity. 46 The latter gives the government the authority to care for a
citizen who is not able to care for himself, a power similar to parental
authority. 147 While the commitment of individuals with psychological
disorders has been justified by both principles, the Supreme Court
recognizes parens patriae authority as the acceptable basis for
commitment statutes.1 48 This authority is balanced against an indi-
vidual's right to refuse medication and treatment. Litigants have
asserted that this right to refuse medication is found in several amend-
ments to the Constitution, including the "First Amendment's
guarantees of freedom of thought and expression." .  More
commonly, however, courts base the right to refuse treatment and
medication on the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 50
144 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1979).
145 David A. Zaheer, Note, Expanding California's Coerced Treatment for the
Mentally Ill: Is the Promise of Caring Treatment in the Community a Lost Hope?, 10
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 385, 388 (2001).
146 id.
147 id.
148 Addington, 441 U.S. at 426 (finding parens patriae authority as the proper
basis for the government's power to provide care for the mentally disabled).
149 Gutterman, supra note 13, at 2416.
150 Id.
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While the Supreme Court has not reviewed AOT laws, it has
addressed Due Process concerns of patients by ruling on their rights
both to refuse medication and to refuse commitment. Addington v.
Texas establishes the federal standard for involuntary commitment
laws.'15  In that case, the appellant's mother filed a petition for his
indefinite commitment in a state mental hospital. The trial court
instructed the jury that to commit the appellant, they must find him
mentally ill and in need of hospitalization for his own protection or
the protection of others by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evi-
dence." 152 The jury committed him. Appellant contended that the
trial court should have required proof "beyond a reasonable doubt."' 53
The Court ruled that an individual's Due Process rights, as well as an
individual's interest in avoiding the stigma of mental illness, require a
more substantial burden of proof than a mere "preponderance of the
evidence."' 154 However, because the psychiatric evaluations necessary
to commit a patient are inherently subjective and uncertain, and
because civil commitment is not punitive, it is unnecessary and
impractical to impose a "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.
55
Therefore, the Fourteenth Amendment requires a "clear and convinc-
ing" standard of proof to commit an individual to a psychiatric hospi-
tal in a civil proceeding.1
56
The Court addressed a patient's right to refuse medication in
Washington v. Harper.5 7  In that case, a convict challenged the
State's ability to forcibly medicate him for his manic-depressive
disorder. The Court held that the procedures 158 established by the
State satisfy the Due Process Clause because they permit medication
only where the patient is dangerous to himself or others, and thus the
State has a legitimate interest in requiring administration of the
drugs. 159 Although the patient has a right to be free from arbitrary
medication, forcible medication with appropriate procedural safe-
guards is "reasonably related" to the State's legitimate interest in
combating the danger posed by potentially violent patients, and a "ra-
tional means of furthering the State's ... objectives."'' 60 The Court
1' Addington, 441 U.S. 418.
152 Id. at 421.
153 Id.
14 Id. at 427.
"' Id. at 428-30.
156 Id at 432-33.
"' 494 U.S. 210, 213 (1990).
158 These procedures allowed a hospital administrative panel, not a judge, to
decide whether to forcibly administer medication to an inmate. Id. at 215-16.
159 Id. at 225-26.
'60 Id. at 221,226.
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also re-affirmed the "clear and convincing" standard set out in
Addington.161
After Harper, whether the Court's "reasonably related" standard
would apply outside of prisons to include all forced medication was
unclear.162 Riggins v. Nevada dispelled any notion that Harper should
be construed broadly. 163 In that case, an individual detained for trial,
but not yet convicted, was forcibly medicated. The Court refused to
extend the Harper "reasonably related" test to individuals not yet
convicted of a crime, applying a stricter "least restrictive alternative"
test. 164 It is thus clear that the right to refuse medication will be
afforded more protection outside of prison walls.
In light of these standards, Jason's Law should pass Federal
Constitutional scrutiny. Because of the unreliability of all psychiatric
diagnoses, 165 it would be impossible to effectively apply the "beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard to any commitment proceeding, whether
inpatient or outpatient. Therefore, it makes sense to extend the "clear
and convincing" standard of proof necessary for inpatient commit-
ment to outpatient statutes as well. Because outpatient care is less
intrusive than inpatient commitment, it could be argued that a lesser
burden of proof, such as the "preponderance of the evidence" stan-
dard, should apply. This Note need not address this point, however,
because "clear and convincing" is the standard in both Ohio's current
AOT statute166 and Jason's Law. 167 Because "clear and convincing" is
the highest standard of proof the Court would impose, Jason's Law
will pass legal scrutiny on this point.
The Harper test requires findings of both dangerousness and that
the State has a legitimate interest in forcing medication. 68 Jason's
law does not explicitly require a finding of dangerousness 169 and
would seem to violate Harper.170  Yet, New York courts find their
161 Id. at 255.
162 Gutterman, supra note 13, at 2421.
163 504 U.S. 127, 133-38 (1992) (holding that it was error to order administra-
tion of antipsychotic drugs during the course of defendant's trial when defendant
objected and the court failed to make findings that there were no less intrusive alter-
natives, that the medication was medically appropriate, and that the medication was
essential for defendant's safety and the safety of others).
'64 Id. at 135-36.
165 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 429-30 (1979).
166 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5122.15(B) (West 2001).
167 H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., § 340.22(C) (Ohio 2007).
168 Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225, 227 (1990).
169 See H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2007).
170 But see, Steele v. Hamilton County Cmty. Mental Health Rd., 736 N.E.2d
10, 18 (Ohio 2000) (holding that the standard of Ohio's current statute, OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 5122.15(C) (West 2001), that the patient must present a substantial risk
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AOT statute harmonious with Harper,171 and Ohio courts should
follow this precedent for similar reasons. 1
72
The application of the second prong of Harper to AOT is less
clear because the Supreme Court has yet to elucidate the issue of how
an individual's right to refuse medication will be treated outside of the
prison context. 73 The government should have a greater interest in
keeping individuals outside of prison walls medicated because in
prison the patients are closely monitored, while outside they may pose
more of a danger to the community because they are unsupervised.
Riggins made it clear, though, that an individual's right to reject
treatment will be given more deference outside of the prison context.
Jason's Law requires that the AOT program be the "least restrictive
services necessary" for treating the patient, so even if courts apply the
higher "least restrictive alternative" test from Riggins to AOT, the bill
will pass Federal Constitutional muster.
B. State Case Law
Because Jason's Law is so similar to New York's Kendra's Law,
and Kendra's Law has been on the books long enough to face chal-
lenges in state court, a survey of how these challenges fared will be
helpful in anticipating how Ohio courts may treat Jason's Law.
The right to refuse medication is firmly established in New York.
In Rivers v. Katz, the New York Court of Appeals held that the due
process clause of the New York Constitution afforded involuntarily
committed patients a right to refuse antipsychotic drugs. 174 The case
involved a challenge by several individuals committed to a state psy-
chiatric facility and medicated against their will. The appeal was
based on their rights to refuse such medication. 75 The trial court dis-
missed the plaintiffs' complaint; however, the court of appeals
reversed, holding that the due process clause of the New York Consti-
tution176 guarantees the mentally ill a fundamental right to refuse
medication. The court qualified this right, noting that "under certain
circumstances [it] may have to yield to ... State interests."'177 The
court found that the State's interests outweigh a patient's right to re-
of harm as manifested by evidence, is synonymous with the dangerousness require-
ment in Harper).
171 See discussion infra Part V.B.
172 See id.
173 See Gutterman, supra note 13, at 2421.
174 Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 341 (N.Y. 1986).
17' Id. at 343.
176 N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
177 Rivers, 495 N.E.2d at 342-43.
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fuse medication in only two circumstances: first, the State may use its
parens patriae authority to forcibly medicate when the patient is
incompetent to make decisions about his own medication; and second,
the State may use its police power to administer medication when the
patient is a danger to himself or society.
178
Ohio and New York interpret their due process clauses similarly;
therefore, Ohio courts should follow the precedent of New York
courts and allow medication in AOT. The due process clause of the
Ohio Constitution 179 affords a similar, limited right to refuse medica-
tion. In In re Guardianship of Willis, the Tenth Appellate District
recognized that a person must be judicially found either dangerous to
society or incompetent in order to justify forcing medication.' 80 Since
in that case the petitioner was previously found legally incompetent to
make decisions, the State was allowed to appoint a guardian who
could ultimately force medication.
18
'
Both Kendra's Law and Jason's Law do not have a dangerousness
requirement to justify the use of police power, nor do they have a
requirement that the patient be incompetent to make decisions to jus-
tify the use of parens patriae authority. 182 On their faces, then, the
two statutes seem to be unconstitutional. However, while the patient
may feel pressured to take his medication in accordance with the AOT
plan, the laws do not actually authorize forcing medication on partici-
pants. Violation of the medication regimen in an AOT program in
and of itself does not carry a legal penalty, but does make the patient
subject to a commitment hearing for inpatient treatment' 83 through
which medication can be compelled. 184 This distinction has proven
essential in New York decisions upholding Kendra's Law, and should
also validate Jason's Law.
178 Id. at 343.
179 OHIO. CONST. art. I, § 16.
180 See 599 N.E.2d 745, 746-47 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) ("[I]f the patient is
declared an incompetent, then she is presumed unable to make an informed decision
and the guardian and/or court is authorized to make it for her... [and] major adverse
intervention can be administered only when the incompetent.., continues to engage
in behavior destructive to himself or others.").
1 Id. at 747-48.
182 See discussion infra Parts III.C, IV.C.
18' H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., § 340.24 (Ohio 2007); N.Y.
MENTAL HYG. LAW § 9.60(n) (McKinney 2006).
184 See Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337, 343 (1986) (explaining that "the State
may be warranted... in administering antipsychotic medication over the patient's
objections" when the patient presents a danger to himself or members of society); In
re Guardianship of Willis, 599 N.E.2d 745, 748 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (upholding the
appointment of a guardian "with the power to authorize the forced administration of
psychotropic drugs" on an incompetent patient).
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In re Urcuyo involved a challenge to Kendra's Law on the
grounds that enforcing a medicinal treatment plan without a prior
finding of incapacity violates an individual's right to refuse medica-
tion. Is8 The court found that the law was constitutional because there
was no forced medication, merely the possibility that if the plan is not
followed the patient may later be subject to inpatient treatment. 186
The court noted that the State has a compelling interest in preventing
patients who may be a risk to the community from becoming danger-
ous, and that the law was narrowly tailored to achieve its end.'87
New York's most comprehensive endorsement of Kendra's Law
came in February of 2004, when the New York Court of Appeals
upheld the law against several due process claims in In re K.L. 188 In
that case, an individual subject to a petition for outpatient treatment
argued that Kendra's Law was unconstitutional because "it [did] not
require a finding of incapacity before a psychiatric patient may be
ordered to comply with assisted outpatient treatment."'89 The court
once again distinguished this case from Rivers, finding Kendra's Law
valid because it "neither authorizes forcible medical treatment in the
first instance nor permits it as a consequence of noncompliance with
court-ordered AOT."' 90 The court went on to reject the argument that
Kendra's Law violates due process because it provides for the tempo-
rary detention of a psychiatric patient without a hearing or notice. 191
The court noted that detention is a significant deprivation of liberty,
but reasoned that the State's interest in protecting its citizens out-
weighs this intrusion.
192
Jason's Law specifically subjects the patient to the inpatient hear-
ing procedure already in place if the patient does not comply with
AOT. 193 Currently, any individual subject to possible inpatient com-
mitment may be detained for up to seventy-two hours before the hear-
ing,194 as is the case in New York. Ohio Courts specifically uphold
185 714 N.Y.S.2d 862, 865 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000).
186 Id. at 868.
187 Id. at 873.
188 See In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d 480, 487 (N.Y. 2004).
189 Id. at 483-84.
190 Id. at 484.
191 If a patient violates his AOT program he can he held for up to seventy-two
hours for observation to determine if inpatient care is necessary. N.Y. MENTAL. HYG.
LAW § 9.60(n) (McKinney 2006).
192 In re K.L., 806 N.E.2d at 487.
19' H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., § 340.24 (Ohio 2007).
194 ORio REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.10 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007).
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this procedure, 195 therefore this part of Jason's Law will be upheld if
challenged.
In conclusion, New York courts have upheld Kendra's Law in its
entirety. Because there are no substantive differences between Ja-
son's Law and Kendra's Law in any of the areas in which the latter
has been challenged, Jason's Law should withstand any legal chal-
lenges.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Ohio should adopt an AOT program. North Carolina and New
York, the two states with the most notable outpatient statutes, have
found that their AOT laws have helped the mentally ill. 196 However,
it is important to make sure that Jason's Law is narrowly tailored
enough so its application is not overbroad,' 97 which would waste state
resources and jeopardize the rights of patients. Several changes to the
bill would help accomplish this.
Before any changes to Jason's Law are considered, it is important
to note that the bill does not direct any more money to mental health
services. Many of the county boards of mental health in Ohio are
already under-funded, including Cuyahoga County's.1 98 Jason's Law
would increase administrative costs to county mental health services
because of the new procedures it establishes, and many of the county
boards of mental health in Ohio are already under-funded, including
the board in Cuyahoga County.199 New York, with a population of
approximately 19 million, 00 spent a total of $32 million for operation
of services related to Kendra's Law in 20 06 .21 Ohio, with a popula-
195 See Dielman v. Roberts, 442 N.E.2d 104, 104 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
196 For North Carolina, see Swartz, supra note 119; N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF
MENTAL HEALTH, KENDRA'S LAW: FINAL REPORT ON THE STATUS OF ASSISTED
OUTPATIENT TREATMENT (2005), http://www.omh.state.ny.us/omhweb/Kendraweb/
finalreport/AOTFinal2005.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2008) (summarizing the effective-
ness of Kendra's Law in New York). For a summary of the effectiveness of Kendra's
Law in New York, see N.Y. St. Off. of Mental Health (March 2005),
http://www.omh.state.ny.us/ombweb/Kendraweb/finalreport/AOTFinal2OO5.pdf.
197 See Watnik, supra note 29, at 1193-94 (describing a study that found
North Carolina's statute to be "overinclusive and not rationally related to the State's
objectives").
198 Harlan Spector, Mental Health HQ Draws Concern: Some Fear $10 Mil-
lion Cost Could Hurt Services, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), July 23, 2007, at
BI.
199 Id.
200 U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: New York,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/36000.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
201 N.Y. STATE OFFICE OF MENTAL HEALTH, supra note 196, at 2.
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tion of roughly 11.5 million,20 2 would have to pay $19 million a year
if the per capita costs prove to be the same. Without more money, it
is unrealistic to anticipate that other services will not be curtailed to
implement AOT.
One possible solution would be to implement a program like
California's, where individual counties decide to adopt AOT
programs, and then are only allowed to implement them if they pledge
that other services will not be cut. However, this is ultimately a bad
idea, because, as in California, few counties would agree to the terms,
and the programs would never be implemented.2 3 As Jason's Law
now stands, no new money is granted, so any proposed changes need
to take county monetary shortages into account.
Ohio should certainly adopt an AOT program. North Carolina
and New York have found that their AOT laws have helped the men-
tally ill tremendously.20 4 However, it is important to make sure that
Jason's Law is not overbroad,2 °5 which would waste state resources
and jeopardize the rights of patients. Several changes to the bill
would help accomplish this.
Along with the petition for an AOT proceeding, Jason's Law
requires an affidavit by a mental health professional asserting that the
patient is "unlikely to survive safely in the community. 20 6 The
professional is not required to divulge the bases for his opinion. Ja-
son's Law should require this affidavit to be more detailed, and in-
clude at least a cursory description of the behavior that led the profes-
sional to his conclusion. This would give patients assurances that
those who are subject to the costs and inconveniences of an AOT
proceeding actually deserve the hearing.
Jason's Law allows a professional to file this affidavit if he tried
to examine the patient but was unable to do so. 20 7 This is necessary to
ensure that patients cannot elude AOT by simply refusing to be exam-
202 U.S. Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts: Ohio,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/39000.html (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).203 See discussion supra Part IV.B.
204 For North Carolina, see Swartz, supra note 119. For a summary of the
effectiveness of Kendra's Law in New York, see N.Y. St. Off. of Mental Health
(March 2005), http://www.omh.state.ny.us/omhweb/Kendraweb/fmalreport/AOT
Final2005.pdf.
205 As studies have shown the North Carolina Statute to be. Watnik, supra
note 24, at 1193.
206 H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., §§ 340.21(B)(1)(c), (2)(c) (Ohio
2007).
207 If the professional has not examined the patient, then he must assert that
the patient is unlikely to survive safely in the community. H.B. 299 § 340.21
(B)(1)(c).
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ined. However, there is a danger that this provision could be used by
a petitioner to circumvent the requirement of actual examination.
Requiring more detail when there has been an unsuccessful attempt to
examine the patient should alleviate this concern. First, the profes-
sional should be required to outline the specific steps he took to try to
examine the patient. This would give respondents the ability to con-
test whether these steps were actually taken. Second, the professional
should still be required to detail the reasons why he thinks the patient
is unlikely to survive safely in the community.20 8 This would ensure
that there are still legitimate bases for the AOT proceeding even when
a patient refuses to be examined.20 9
There are also several procedural changes that should be made to
Jason's Law. While the bill should pass procedural Due Process chal-
lenges as is, the changes would temper public opposition to the bill
and lead to fewer court challenges, which ultimately waste resources.
First, at least two experts should have to testify at an AOT hearing.
As the bill is written, the State's physician is the only expert that
needs to appear in court to compel an AOT plan.210 Therefore, only
those patients who have enough money to hire an outside expert can
hope to rebut the State's expert. Even then, there is very little time to
secure such testimony before the hearing.2 Ideally, the State would
provide funding with which any respondent could hire an outside
expert, but because of potentially astronomical costs this is unrealis-
tic.212 Requiring the State to present two experts would be a compro-
mise. An additional examining physician should lead to more accu-
rate diagnoses and the exclusion of many individuals from AOT who
do not need it. Therefore, actually implementing fewer AOT
programs could offset the cost of presenting additional testimony.
This does not address the problem of respondents lacking an expert
testifying on their behalves, but would lead to fewer patients in AOT
programs who do not belong there.
208 Importantly, the professional is not required to divulge the bases for his
conclusion. H.B. 299 § 340.21 (B)(1)(c).
209 The fact that an individual refuses examination does not make him per se
unlikely to survive safely in the community. Presumably, many sane individuals
would refuse to submit to an examination if they felt it was unnecessary.
210 See H.B. 299 §§ 340.22(A), (E).
2 H.B. 299 § 340.22(A) (stating that "the court shall schedule a hearing not
later than three business days after receipt of the petition").
212 Medical experts typically charge at least $100 per hour for case review,
and generally more for actual trial testimony. See MedicoLegal Consultants, Medical
and Scientific Experts: Obtain an Expert, http://www.mlegal.com/obtaining
%20an%20expert.htm (last visited Sept. 5, 2008).
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Jason's Law should also explicitly outline when and how the
respondent can participate in planning the AOT program. Currently,
the respondent has the option of participating, but how exactly he may
contribute is not specified.21 3 The patient could be given a formal
meeting with the State physician who is charged with presenting the
plan at the proceeding. Thus, the patient could voice concern over
specific provisions that do not comport with his lifestyle and suggest
another, equally effective solution. The physician would not have an
obligation to accept these changes, but at least the decision-maker
would hear the patient's opinion. This meeting should be within the
regularly scheduled window between notice to the patient and the
hearing itself, and if a patient fails to show up to a scheduled meeting,
his opportunity to participate would be forfeited. This would ensure
that these meetings do not unnecessarily delay the proceeding. Giving
the patient actual veto power over aspects of the plan would give the
patient more power, but would ultimately prove unworkable because a
patient would likely take issue with the more restrictive - and often
effective - portions of the plan.
Jason's Law allows only the physician supervising a patient's
program the power to petition the court to make changes in an imple-
mented AOT plan.214 This gives the supervising physician almost
absolute power over a patient, and gives patients no available means
of relief if they are having problems with an aspect of the plan or have
a personality conflict with the supervising physician. To alleviate this
concern, patients should be given the opportunity to petition the court.
Nevertheless, because patients may abuse this privilege and call a
hearing whenever the doctor does not give in to a demand, patients
should be allotted a limited number of hearings.
If Jason's Law is implemented, the greatest waste of resources
will likely be subjecting individuals who are not appropriate candi-
dates for AOT to hearings and programs. Indeed, these are the prob-
lems North Carolina has faced. 215 The easiest way to avoid this would
be to limit the parties who can petition the court for an initial hearing,
perhaps to nuclear family members and doctors. However, this would
severely curtail the bill's effectiveness. Many of the individuals in
need of AOT - perhaps those who need it most - may not be part of a
traditional family unit or under the care of a doctor. While expansive,
the list of potential petitioners in Jason's Law is large enough to
include those who have significant daily contact with almost any
213 H.B. 299, 127th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., § 340.22(B) (Ohio 2007).
214 Id. § 340.23.
215 See discussion supra Part 1V.C.
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potential respondent.216 Therefore, to maintain the bill's efficacy and
at the same time conserve resources, Jason's Law should be more
selective about who is enrolled in AOT programs, not who is allowed
to petition for a proceeding.
Another way to maximize resources would be to add at least one
additional examining physiatrist, which would help ensure that
diagnoses are accurate. Increasing the standard for commitment in the
bill from future or potential dangerousness to Ohio's current require-
ment of a substantial risk of harm as manifested by evidence would
also help. This would cut costs by reducing unnecessary participation
in AOT while still combating the problem Jason's Law was designed
to prevent: keeping clearly dangerous people like Timothy Halton off
of the streets.
Jason's Law was introduced in response to a high profile murder
by a mentally ill individual, and is supposed to prevent similar trage-
dies in the future;217 the same reason other states introduced their
AOT laws, many of which have lowered legal standards for AOT.21 8
However, Timothy Halton exhibited explicit signs that he was
dangerous, as did many of the perpetrators of the crimes that caused
other states to enact AOT laws. 219 Halton clearly met the existing
threshold for court ordered AOT,22 ° yet he was not enrolled in any
program at the time he killed Jason West. It is clear that an overly
strict legal standard is not to blame. Halton could have been roaming
the streets either because someone who noticed his behavior lacked
the power to request a court hearing, or because he was not adequately
monitored. The expanded list of potential petitioners under Jason's
Law can address situations in which the former is the issue; however,
it would do nothing to better monitor individuals.
VII. CONCLUSION
Lack of funding is a significant obstacle for Jason's Law. What-
ever legal standard or language the bill ultimately employs, its effec-
tiveness will hinge on making sure AOT receives adequate funding to
implement its programs. The future success of Jason's Law will
216 See discussion supra Part llI.C.
217 Rollenhagen, supra note 20.
218 See supra notes 88-95.
219 See sources cited supra notes 83-90.
220 Specifically, there was evidence that Halton manifested a substantial risk
of physical harm to others. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 5122.01(B) (West 2001 & Supp.
2007).
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depend on how the Ohio House of Representatives and the Governor
choose to deal with the program's increased costs.
Jason's Law, introduced in the wake of the murder of Jason West
by an individual who was clearly ill, was written with the best of
intentions. Other states have shown that AOT can be a very effective
tool in treating the mentally ill. However, Jason's Law has an unnec-
essarily low threshold for admission and will subject people to AOT
who do not belong there. This will severely infringe on the personal
liberties of potential participants. Many view this cost as collateral,
and courts are not likely to step in and protect participants. However,
such an over-inclusive program will also waste precious state funds
and resources. This alone should be enough to convince people that
the bill should be amended.
Jason's Law should be amended to require a finding of a substan-
tial risk of harm as manifested by evidence, Ohio's current standard.
By allowing people to initiate hearings and providing the means to get
help, the bill would still keep clearly dangerous and mentally ill indi-
viduals, like Timothy Halton, off the street. It would also conserve
resources and protect patient rights. The death of Jason West is tragic.
But we need to clear the haze of reactionary outrage from our minds
and see Jason's Law for what it really is: a good idea taken a step too
far.
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